Algebraic Cryptanalysis of Baby Rijndael
Algebraická kryptoanalýza Baby Rijndael
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České vysoké učení technické v Praze
Czech Technical University in Prague
Czech Technical University in Prague
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V této práci se zabýváme algebraickou kryptoanalýzou šifry Baby Rijndael. Baby Rijndael je zjednodušená verze nejpoužívanější symetrické blokové šifry AES. Provádíme útoky se znalostí otevřeného a šifrového textu. Postupně jsme útočili na jednu, dvě a čtyři rundy této šifry. Každou rundu si můžeme vyjádřit pomocí soustavy rovnic do stupně maximálně 2. Při útoku se snažíme tuto soustavu vyřešit a k tomu používáme algoritmy XL, XSL, T' a další heuristické postupy. Pro jednu rundu se nám podařilo šifru prolomit. Pro dvě rundy jsme museli znát čtvrtinu bitů klíče a pro čtyři rundy jsme museli znát skoro polovinu bitů klíče.
In this Theses we deal with algebraic cryptanalysis of Baby Rijndael cipher. Baby Rijndael is a simplified version of the most used symetric block cipher AES. We do the attacks with knowledge of the open text and the cipher text. Gradually, we attack one, two and four rounds of this cipher. We can express each round as a system of equations with maximum degree of terms equal to two. During attacks we try to solve this system using algorithms XL, XSL, T' and some heuristics. For one round we managed to break the cipher. For two rounds we must know one quarter of bits of the key and for four rounds we must know almost half of bits of the key.
In this Theses we deal with algebraic cryptanalysis of Baby Rijndael cipher. Baby Rijndael is a simplified version of the most used symetric block cipher AES. We do the attacks with knowledge of the open text and the cipher text. Gradually, we attack one, two and four rounds of this cipher. We can express each round as a system of equations with maximum degree of terms equal to two. During attacks we try to solve this system using algorithms XL, XSL, T' and some heuristics. For one round we managed to break the cipher. For two rounds we must know one quarter of bits of the key and for four rounds we must know almost half of bits of the key.